

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

BRUCE CORKER d/b/a RANCHO ALOHA;
COLEHOUR BONDERA and MELANIE
BONDERA, husband and wife d/b/a
KANALANI OHANA FARM; ROBERT SMITH
and CECELIA SMITH, husband and
wife d/b/a SMITHFARMS, and SMITHFARMS,
LLC on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

Mulvadi Corporation,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-CV-00290-RSL

**MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND REIMBURSEMENT OF
LITIGATION EXPENSES**

The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik

Noted for consideration: November 30,
2023

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

I. Introduction 1

II. Background.....4

III. Argument.....8

 A. Class Counsel’s Requested Fee is Fair, Reasonable, and Appropriate. 10

 1. Class Counsel Achieved an Outstanding Result For the Class. 10

 2. The Complexity and Risk Associated With This Litigation Supports the Requested Fees. 12

 3. The Requested Fees Are Below That Awarded in Other Common Fund Cases Involving Valuable Injunctive Relief..... 15

 4. A Lodestar Cross-Check, If Conducted, Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested Award. 16

 B. Class Counsel’s Expenses Are Reasonable..... 17

 C. Service Awards for the Class Representatives Are Appropriate..... 18

IV. Conclusion20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Anderson v. Merit Energy Co.,
07-916, 2009 WL 3378526 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2009) 16

Arthur v. Sallie Mae Inc.,
10-cv-198, 2012 WL 4076119 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2012)..... 17

Attia v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC,
2019 WL 13089601 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2019) 9

Beck, et al. v. Boeing Co.,
Case No. 00-CV-0301-MJP, Dkt. 1067 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2004) 19

Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc.,
No. CIV-02-285-RAW, 2011 WL 4478766 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2011) 20

Beesley v. Int’l Paper Co.,
No. 3:06-CV-703-DRH-CJP, 2014 WL 375432 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2014) 18

Bennett v. SimplexGrinnell LP,
No. 11-1854, 2015 WL 12932332 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015) 10, 12, 16

Benson v. DoubleDown Interactive, LLC,
18-cv-525 2023 WL 3761929 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2023)..... 9, 16

Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,
444 U.S. 472 (1980) 8

Browning v. Yahoo! Inc.,
No. 04-1463, 2007 WL 4105971 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007)..... 12

Chieftain Royalty Co. v. XTO Ener. Inc.,
No. 11-29, 2018 WL 2296588 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 27, 2018) 12, 16

Corzine v. Whirlpool Corp.,
No. 15-5764, 2019 WL 7372275 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2019) 12

Craft v. Cty. of San Bernardino,
624 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 16

de Mira v. Heartland Emp’t Serv., LLC,
No. 12 -4092, 2014 WL 1026282 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014) 16

DeStefano v. Zynga, Inc.,
2016 WL 537946 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016) 15

Farrell v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
N.A., 827 Fed. Appx. 628 (9th Cir. 2020) 16

Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S.,
307 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2002) 17

Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co.,
No. 11-8405, 2015 WL 10847814 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2015) 12

Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
No. CV 08 1365 CW EMC, 2010 WL 1687832 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) 19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Cont'd)

		<u>Page</u>
1	<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Grp.</i> , 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998).....	9
2	<i>Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co.</i> , No. 16-CV-05479-JST, 2018 WL 6619983 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2018).....	17
3	<i>Hensley v. Eckerhart</i> , 461 U.S. 424 (1983)	10
4	<i>Herrera v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.</i> , No. 18-cv-00332, 2021 WL 9374975 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2021).....	10
5	<i>Herrera v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.</i> , No. 18-cv-00332, 2021 WL 9374975 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2021).....	10
6	<i>In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.</i> , 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011).....	9, 12
7	<i>In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig.</i> , 2013 WL 11319243.....	12, 16
8	<i>In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig.</i> , 2016 WL 2731524 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016).....	17
9	<i>In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig.</i> , 2016 WL 2731524 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016).....	17
10	<i>In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig.</i> , 586 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2008).....	17
11	<i>In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.</i> , 11-cv-2509, 2015 WL 5158730 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015)	19
12	<i>In re HQ Sustainable Maritime Indus., Inc. Deriv. Litig.</i> , No. 11-910, 2016 WL 5421626 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2013).....	9
13	<i>In re HQ Sustainable Maritime Indus., Inc. Deriv. Litig.</i> , No. 11-910, 2016 WL 5421626 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2013).....	9
14	<i>In re Infospace, Inc. Sec. Litig.</i> , 330 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (W.D. Wash. 2004).....	15
15	<i>In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.</i> , 213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (June 19, 2000).....	16
16	<i>In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Securities Litigation</i> , 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010).....	1
17	<i>In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.</i> , 2017 WL 6040065 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017)	17
18	<i>In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.</i> , 2017 WL 6040065 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017)	17
19	<i>In re Omnivision Technologies, Inc.</i> , 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2008).....	9, 10, 13, 15
20	<i>In re Payment Card Antitrust Litig.</i> , 991 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).....	17
21	<i>In re Payment Card Antitrust Litig.</i> , 991 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).....	17
22	<i>In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig.</i> , No. 10-318, 2013 WL 6577029 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2013).....	19
23	<i>In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.</i> , No. 2672 CRB (JSC), 2017 WL 1047834 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017).....	9
24	<i>In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.</i> , 19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994).....	8, 15
25	<i>In re: Samsung Top-Load Washing Machine Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litig.</i> , 997 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2021).....	12
26	<i>In re: Samsung Top-Load Washing Machine Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litig.</i> , 997 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2021).....	12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Cont'd)

		<u>Page</u>
1	<i>Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co.</i> , 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001)	19
2	<i>Johnson v. Fujitsu Tech. & Bus. of Am., Inc.</i> ,	
3	No. 16-cv-03698-NC, 2018 WL 2183253 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018)	17
4	<i>Knight v. Red Door Salons, Inc.</i> ,	
5	08-cv-1520, 2009 WL 248367 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009)	16
6	<i>Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship</i> ,	
7	No. 96-3008, 1997 WL 450064 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1997)	16
8	<i>Lucken Family Ltd. P’ship, LLLP v. Ultra Resources, Inc.</i> ,	
9	2010 WL 5837559 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2010)	12
10	<i>Lusby v. GameStop Inc.</i> ,	
11	No. 12-3783, 2015 WL 1501095 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015)	16
12	<i>Martin v. Toyota Motor Cred. Corp.</i> ,	
13	No. 20-cv-10518, 2022 WL 17038908 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2022)	10, 17
14	<i>Powers v. Eichen</i> ,	
15	229 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2000)	9
16	<i>Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp.</i> ,	
17	563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009)	18
18	<i>Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC</i> ,	
19	944 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2019)	10, 11
20	<i>Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.</i> ,	
21	140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020)	14
22	<i>Seaman v. Duke Univ.</i> ,	
23	No. 1:15-CV-462, 2019 WL 4674758 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2019)	20
24	<i>Staton v. Boeing Co.</i> ,	
25	327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003)	passim
26	<i>Sugai Prods., Inc. v. Kona Kai Farms, Inc.</i> ,	
	No. 97-cv-00043, 1997 WL 824022 (D. Haw. Nov. 19, 1997)	13
	<i>Tiro v. Public House Investments, LLC</i> ,	
	2013 WL 4830949 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 2013)	13
	<i>Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.</i> ,	
	No. 04 Civ. 09194 (CM), 2010 WL 4877852 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010)	20
	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc.</i> ,	
	557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977)	8
	<i>Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.</i> ,	
	290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002)	9, 16, 17
	<i>Willner v. Manpower Inc.</i> ,	
	No. 11-cv-02846-JST, 2015 WL 3863625 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015)	18
	<i>Wilson v. Playtika, Ltd.</i> ,	
	18-cv-5277, 2021 WL 512230 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 2021)	12, 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Cont'd)

Page

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 1125, *et seq.*4

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)8

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)8, 9, 17

Treatises

Federal Judicial Center, *Manual for Complex Litigation*
§ 21.71 (4th ed. 2004)9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

1 Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel¹ respectfully move for an Order awarding
 2 attorneys' fees, reimbursement of litigation expenses, and service awards to the named Plaintiffs
 3 in connection with the final settlement in this long-running and hard-fought litigation. The final
 4 approval hearing on this proposed settlement with Mulvadi Corporation ("Mulvadi") is set for
 5 November 30, 2023. *See* Dkt. 884.² Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Counsel request that they be
 6 awarded \$3.7 million in fees, \$170,000 of litigation expenses, and service awards of \$2,500 per
 7 farm (for a total of three awards) in recognition of their substantial and continuing commitments
 8 of time to this litigation, including to this settlement and its implementation.

9 This is the final settlement in this matter, and if the Court approves this settlement, class
 10 counsel's total compensation in this case will be 14.46% of the economic value of all settlements
 11 reached in this litigation (\$122.375 million). As demonstrated below, this request is fair and
 12 reasonable under the governing standard.

13 **I. Introduction**

14 This Mulvadi settlement is the result of dogged and creative efforts on the part of Class
 15 Counsel, who persisted in their efforts to obtain monetary and injunctive relief for the class even
 16 after Mulvadi declared bankruptcy and even after it appeared that there was simply no source of
 17 money to fund a fair and reasonable settlement. Against the odds, Class Counsel negotiated a
 18 settlement that adds \$7.775 million in cash compensation to the more than \$33.4 million in
 19 approved settlements with other defendants to date. It also contains the most stringent injunctive
 20 relief of any prior settlement, including a prohibition on Mulvadi's doing business with certain
 21 questionable suppliers, and extends the required practice changes to Mulvadi's owner in his
 22 personal capacity. These provisions will ensure improved and clearer labeling of coffee held out
 23

24 ¹ Settlement Class Counsel are those counsel so appointed pursuant to the Court's Order Granting Motion for
 25 Preliminary Approval and Directing Issuance of Notice (Dkt. 884) ¶ 8: Nathan T. Paine of Karr Tuttle Campbell,
 and Jason Lichtman, Daniel Seltz, and Andrew Kaufman of Lief Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

26 ² Consistent with *In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Securities Litigation*, 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010), Class Counsel
 are making this application well in advance of the deadline for Settlement Class Members to opt-out or object to the
 proposed settlement, which is October 20, 2023, and will also post this application on the settlement website.

1 to be from the Kona region from Mulvadi, when and if it emerges from bankruptcy, *and* from
2 businesses or entities controlled by Mulvadi's owner, should he return to the Kona coffee
3 business. This injunctive relief is part of overall market reforms that the numerous prior
4 settlements have worked together to advance; the total value of injunctive relief for the class
5 across all settlements is \$81.2 million. *See* Dkt. 879-3 (Schreck Decl.) ¶ 7.

6 As the Court knows from its oversight and approval of prior settlements, through the
7 litigation and the injunctive relief in the settlements, millions of pounds of falsely labeled Kona
8 coffee have been removed from the market, and there has been an increase in market price for
9 authentic Kona coffee. Kona farmers had longed tried to achieve these market reforms through
10 legislative, public relations, and prior litigation efforts with little success. Even then, it required
11 law firms willing and able to front millions of dollars in costs—resources far beyond the means
12 of the typical Kona farmer—to conduct the scientific testing to identify the mislabeled Kona
13 coffee products and retain economic, marketing, survey, and industry experts to achieve this
14 remarkable result.

15 The Mulvadi settlement is the end of a long road, but one which Class Counsel have
16 ensured was as direct and efficiently traveled as possible. This case originally included more
17 than twenty defendants. It pitted three small, long-time Kona coffee farms against 22 coffee
18 suppliers and retailers, selling a variety of coffee products across the country in multiple
19 channels of commerce. While many Kona farmers had previously expressed frustration at the
20 misuse of the Kona name, they had been without the information and tools to identify defendants
21 and formulate cognizable legal claims. With this litigation, Class Counsel have been able to
22 transform the Kona farmers' frustration into tangible results with both immediate (substantial
23 monetary relief) and long-term benefits (injunctive relief). This settlement with Mulvadi
24 represents the crowning success benefiting the hard-working Kona farmers and further
25 strengthening the Kona name.

26 As Class Counsel demonstrated in their prior applications for fees and reimbursement of

1 expenses (Dkt. 415, Dkt. 654, Dkt. 742, 878), litigation of this magnitude required a substantial
2 expenditure of time and money. Class Counsel spent, as of this filing, 25,639.30 hours on this
3 case, with 46 attorneys, paralegals, and other staff each devoting substantial time (at least 40
4 hours) to this case. As with prior settlements, there will be further work to implement this
5 settlement and to monitor previously settling defendants' compliance with the injunctive terms of
6 their settlements.

7 Every aspect of the litigation was hard fought. To recap, Class Counsel's work has
8 included: extensive pre-litigation investigation, which included the identification and retention of
9 a renowned scientist, Dr. James Ehleringer from the University of Utah, to test hundreds of
10 coffee samples to accurately identify the falsely labeled Kona coffee products flooding the
11 market, successfully opposing multiple motions to dismiss, document production and review of
12 thousands of documents from the named plaintiffs, review of thousands of documents from
13 Defendants, more than a dozen discovery motions, extensive third-party discovery that has
14 involved 52 subpoenas and the production of more than 7,400 documents, more than thirty
15 depositions, including full-day depositions of each of the plaintiffs, a motion for default, and a
16 litigated class certification motion that included extensive expert work. After the close of fact
17 discovery, Plaintiffs presented expert reports from seven testifying witnesses, six of whom were
18 deposed and provided rebuttal reports. Plaintiffs deposed all five of MNS's testifying experts and
19 filed motions to exclude the testimony of four of them, in addition to filing a motion for
20 summary judgment. Class Counsel also moved for sanctions against Mulvadi's counsel, have
21 appeared in and participated in the bankruptcy proceedings involving both Mulvadi and HIKC to
22 advocate for the claims of the class as creditors, and continue to spend time and resources
23 monitoring various defendants' compliance with their settlement terms. *See* Lichtman Decl. ¶¶ 4-
24 8; Paine Decl. ¶¶ 4-8.

25 To date, Class Counsel have spent more than \$3.39 million in out-of-pocket costs, much
26 of it attributable to identifying and working with their experts, who were prepared to testify

1 concerning the coffee industry, marketing, consumer confusion, accounting, and damages. Of
 2 those total costs, \$108,145.99 remains unreimbursed and not encompassed by the pending
 3 petition for reimbursement of costs from the MNS settlement, and Class Counsel anticipate that
 4 there will be additional costs required to administer the notice, claims, and distribution processes
 5 of this settlement and prior settlements. Lichtman Decl. ¶ 17. The compensation that Class
 6 Counsel seek for their work remains well below the standard benchmarks in successful class
 7 litigation, whether measured as a percentage of total economic value of the settlement or under
 8 the lodestar method.³

9 **II. Background**

10 The Court is familiar with this litigation’s factual and procedural background, but
 11 Plaintiffs again provide an updated recounting so that the record supporting this request is
 12 complete.

13 Class Counsel filed this case in 2019 following an extensive and unprecedented
 14 investigation aimed at solving a question that had troubled Kona farmers: How is more than 20
 15 million pounds of coffee labeled as “Kona” sold annually, when only a fraction of that is actually
 16 produced each year from the Kona region? *See* Third Am. Compl. (Dkt. 381) ¶ 44. The answer,
 17 Plaintiffs alleged, was that these suppliers were selling coffee labeled as “Kona” coffee that
 18 expert testing revealed contained little or no authentic Kona coffee. Plaintiffs alleged that this
 19 conduct violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, *et seq.*, and sought monetary compensation,
 20 as well as injunctive relief that would repair the Kona name going forward. Class actions under
 21 the Lanham Act, while not unheard of, are unusual, and to Class Counsel’s knowledge, no other
 22 case invoking the statute had been brought on behalf of a class of Kona farmers to remedy the
 23 harms alleged here. Following the investigation set out in the complaint into the contents of the
 24 coffee at issue, which included costly and time-consuming scientific testing of hundreds of
 25 _____

26 ³ This is true even assuming that the Court grants in full Class Counsel’s petition for attorneys’ fees and expenses from the settlement with MNS. That petition is pending at the time of this submission.

1 coffee samples,⁴ Plaintiffs identified and named nineteen Defendants, ultimately adding three
2 additional defendants as the case progressed.

3 A group of retailer defendants and a group of supplier defendants filed motions to
4 dismiss; one defendant filed a separate motion to dismiss. *See* Dkt. Nos. 100, 106, & 107,
5 respectively. On November 12, 2019, the Court denied the suppliers' and the separate
6 defendant's motions in full, and denied the retailers' motion in part, dismissing only false
7 advertising claims against the retailers. *See* Dkt. Nos. 154-56.

8 An extended period of hard-fought discovery then began in the fall of 2019. The sheer
9 number of parties, their geographic dispersal, and their separate representation would have
10 presented management challenges in ordinary times, but the onset of the global health crisis in
11 March 2020 compounded these difficulties. Class Counsel were up to the challenge: they
12 gathered more than 113,000 documents totaling more than 427,000 pages from all of the
13 defendants (including production of data in large spreadsheets). They also responded to
14 comprehensive requests to the class representatives, who themselves produced more than 58,000
15 documents, totaling more than 114,000 pages, in response to a collective 543 requests for
16 documents, while also responding to 261 interrogatories and 514 requests for admission. The
17 parties also engaged in extensive third-party discovery, collectively serving 52 subpoenas, which
18 have yielded 7,428 documents and more than 123,000 pages. While Class Counsel sought to find
19 efficiencies where at all possible and to avoid judicial intervention in discovery disputes, they
20 have litigated, and the Court has resolved, numerous disputes involving the proper scope of
21 discovery. *See* Dkt. Nos. 144, 248, 255, 266, 274, 341, 350, 362, 382, 470, 477, 487, 578, 694;;
22 *see also* Dkt. 621, 641. Plaintiffs also moved to strike certain affirmative defenses asserted by
23 most defendants (Dkt. 179), prompting the withdrawal of the affirmative defenses by certain
24 defendants (Dkt. 191), as well as the Court's striking the defenses of Mulvadi. Dkt. 230. The
25 Court also denied another defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. *See* Dkt. 606.

26 _____
⁴ *See* Dkt. 574-19 (Dr. Ehleringer declaration explaining his testing); Dkt. 734-1 (Dr. Ehleringer's expert report).

1 The parties ultimately took 31 depositions. Defendants took the depositions of the five
2 named plaintiffs during the week of August 17, 2020, plus a third party. Plaintiffs have taken or
3 participated in twelve depositions (including a creditor examination in Mulvadi's bankruptcy
4 proceeding) of parties and non-parties to date, took two expert depositions in connection with
5 class certification, deposed each of MNS's five experts, and defended the depositions of six of
6 their merits experts.

7 Plaintiffs filed their class certification motion against non-settling defendants, which at
8 that time included MNS and one other defendant (L&K), on December 22, 2021, supported by
9 five expert declarations. That motion followed a motion for default against Mulvadi (Dkt. 544)
10 on November 23, 2021. Fact discovery closed on March 11, 2022. Expert discovery then
11 proceeded, which involved the exchange of seventeen reports and the eleven depositions
12 described above. The remaining parties then filed their summary judgment and *Daubert* motions
13 on December 16, 2022, along with motion to disqualify two of MNS's retained experts.

14 Class Counsel balanced this continuous and intensive litigation work with efforts at
15 resolution where appropriate. From early in the case, in part in order to negotiate effectively on
16 behalf of the Settlement Class, Class Counsel identified, interviewed, engaged, and intensively
17 worked with nationally recognized experts in the fields of marketing, accounting, and the coffee
18 industry, as well as retained damages experts. An early mediation in San Francisco with Hon.
19 David Garcia on January 30, 2020 resulted in the settlement with Copper Moon; a near-global
20 mediation on June 2, 2020 with Hon. Edward Infante resulted in a settlement with Boyer's
21 Coffee Company. Settlements with Cost Plus and Maui Coffee Company followed that
22 mediation, and an all-day mediation with Mark LeHocky, of ADR Services, Inc., on
23 November 17, 2020, led to a settlement with Cameron's Coffee and Distribution Company.
24 Another session with Mr. LeHocky led to settlements with another group of defendants, and
25 additional settlements with two retailer defendants followed thereafter. The previous set of
26 settlements presented to the Court – with Kroger, Safeway/Albertsons, and HIKC – also

1 followed a mediation with Mark LeHocky involving Kroger and a mediation with Kale Feldman
2 involving HIKC. The settlement with L&K was mediated by Robert Meyer of JAMS, as was the
3 subsequent settlement with MNS.

4 Even getting to the mediation table with Mulvadi was a drawn-out process. Mulvadi and
5 its prior counsel declined even to participate in the early mediation with Judge Infante, and
6 engaged in what this Court has described as a series of “willful” discovery failures, including
7 “false representations regarding the nature of Mulvadi’s records, unreasonable and unjustified
8 discovery stances, lengthy delays in production, and recalcitrance in the face of clear and
9 unambiguous discovery orders.” Dkt. 677, at 12-13. It was only through Class Counsel’s
10 participation as a creditor on behalf of the class in Mulvadi’s bankruptcy proceedings that
11 relevant insurance coverage was discovered, leading to discussions with counsel for Mulvadi’s
12 insurer, that the parties were able to constructively mediate. It took multiple mediations and
13 follow-up communications with Mr. LeHocky to reach a deal. *See* Dkt. 872 ¶ 6.

14 Those efforts paid off. This settlement is another outstanding outcome for the Settlement
15 Class. The relatively small class of approximately 700 farms will see significant payments from
16 the settlement. Mulvadi’s insurer is paying a sum greater than the total limits available under the
17 implicated primary policies. In addition, Mulvadi will, like previously settling defendants, alter
18 its labeling of Kona-labeled coffee so that such products “will accurately and unambiguously
19 state on the front label of the product the minimum percentage of authentic Kona coffee beans
20 the supplier of the products states are contained in the product” in compliance with Hawaii law
21 (regardless of whether the product is sold in Hawaii or not), and even if Hawaii law changes in
22 the future. Dkt. 883-2 ¶ 12(a). But this settlement goes yet further: Mulvadi and its owner in his
23 personal capacity have agreed to stop doing business with certain questionable suppliers, to
24 obtain proof that any coffee they purchase is genuine Kona, to print what is called the lot number
25 on every bag of coffee that they sell (this will more easily allow buyers and competitors to
26 confirm the coffees’ authenticity), and to pay all fees and costs for any future action to enforce

1 the settlement. *Id.* 12(c)-(d).

2 As with the previous settlements, which were successfully implemented, Class Counsel
 3 have been working diligently with the notice administrator to effectuate the notice plan and
 4 prepare to distribute the settlement funds. Class Counsel will repeat the successful claims process
 5 (which will not require the provision of any additional information for the hundreds of class
 6 members who previously submitted claims) and work with the Settlement Administrator to
 7 implement that process promptly after final approval, as they have done successfully in three
 8 prior claims processes.⁵

9 **III. Argument**

10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) permits the court to award reasonable attorney’s
 11 fees and costs in class action settlements as authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement. Fed.
 12 R. Civ. P. 23(h). “[L]awyer[s] who recover[] a common fund . . . [are] entitled to a reasonable
 13 attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.” *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980);
 14 *Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1977). In deciding whether a
 15 requested fee is appropriate, the Court’s task is to determine whether such amount is
 16 “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938, 963 (9th
 17 Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)); *In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.*, 19
 18 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (overriding principle is that the fee award be “reasonable
 19 under the circumstances”).

20 In this Circuit, the determination typically involves analysis of a number of factors,
 21 including: (1) the results achieved by class counsel; (2) the complexity of the case and skill
 22 required; (3) the risks of litigation; (4) the benefits to the class beyond the immediate generation
 23 of a cash fund; (5) the market rate of customary fees for similar cases; (6) the contingent nature
 24 of the representation and financial burden carried by counsel; and (7) a lodestar cross-check. *See*,

25 _____
 26 ⁵ For the sake of efficiency and to minimize any potential confusion among Settlement Class Members, the claims
 process for the MNS and Mulvadi settlements will be implemented together.

1 e.g., *In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, No. 2672
 2 CRB (JSC), 2017 WL 1047834, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017) (“VW 2L Fee Order”) (citing
 3 *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-52 (9th Cir. 2002)). Each of these factors
 4 supports Class Counsel’s request in this case.

5 Because the benefit achieved “is easily quantified in common-fund settlements,” courts
 6 can “award attorneys a percentage of the common fund in lieu of the often more time-consuming
 7 task of calculating the lodestar.” *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942
 8 (9th Cir. 2011).⁶ When awarding attorney’s fees on the percentage of the fund method in
 9 common fund cases, twenty-five percent (25%) is the benchmark, but a court may adjust that
 10 benchmark upward when warranted. *See Powers v. Eichen*, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256–57 (9th Cir.
 11 2000); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that “complexity
 12 and novelty of the issues” can justify upward departure from benchmark); *In re HQ Sustainable*
 13 *Maritime Indus., Inc. Deriv. Litig.*, No. 11-910, 2016 WL 5421626, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26,
 14 2013) (Lasnik, J.) (holding that complexity of the dispute, including number of participants,
 15 justified upward departure from benchmark); *Benson v. DoubleDown Interactive, LLC*, 18-cv-
 16 525, 2023 WL 3761929 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2023) (Lasnik, J.) (holding upward departure
 17 justified). Courts have recognized that “in most common fund cases, the award exceeds that
 18 [25%] benchmark.” *In re Omnivision Technologies, Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal.
 19 2008). Indeed, courts in the Ninth Circuit “routinely” award fee awards of one-third or higher in
 20 appropriate cases. *Attia v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC*, 2019 WL 13089601, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
 21 25, 2019) (gathering authorities).

22
 23
 24 ⁶ Courts rely on the lodestar method in cases very different than this one, in which “there is no way to gauge the net
 25 value of the settlement or of any percentage thereof.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1029. Courts may also elect to (but need
 26 not) conduct a “cross-check” even in common fund litigation. *See* Section III(A)(4), below. In successful cases,
 counsel frequently receive between 2 and 6 times their lodestar. *See id.* Class Counsel are far below this standard
 measure here, largely because of the amount of time that was devoted to navigating issues with Buchalter, the
 subject of a separate motion.

1 **A. Class Counsel’s Requested Fee is Fair, Reasonable, and Appropriate.**

2 **1. Class Counsel Achieved an Outstanding Result For the Class.**

3 The results obtained for the class are generally considered to be the most important factor
4 in determining the appropriate fee award. *See Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983); *In*
5 *re Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046; *see also* Federal Judicial Center, *Manual for Complex*
6 *Litigation* § 21.71, p. 336 (4th ed. 2004) (the “fundamental focus is the result actually achieved
7 for class members”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) committee note). Here, any assessment of the
8 results achieved must include both the monetary and injunctive components of this settlement.
9 While each standing alone is outstanding (the settlement amount of \$7.775 million *exceeds* the
10 limits of the relevant insurance policies), they together form what is unquestionably an
11 exceptional result, and one that justifies the fee sought.

12 Where a class settlement includes both monetary and injunctive relief, courts “include
13 [the latter] as part of the value of a common fund for purposes of applying the percentage
14 method of determining fees” when “the value to individual class members of benefits deriving
15 from injunctive relief can be accurately ascertained.” *Staton*, 327 F.3d at 974; *see also Roes, 1-2*
16 *v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC*, 944 F.3d 1035, 1056 (9th Cir. 2019) (“readily quantifiable”); *see also,*
17 *e.g., Martin v. Toyota Motor Cred. Corp.*, No. 20-cv-10518, 2022 WL 17038908, at *11 (C.D.
18 Cal. Nov. 15, 2022) (adding value of injunctive relief, including business practice changes, to
19 cash award in awarding fee on percentage of total economic value of settlement); *Bennett v.*
20 *SimplexGrinnell LP*, No. 11-1854, 2015 WL 12932332, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015) (same);
21 *Herrera v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, No. 18-cv-00332, 2021 WL 9374975, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
22 16, 2021) (same). The Court’s fee calculation should reflect the actual and readily-quantifiable
23 economic value of the settlements that Class Counsel have negotiated to date, including this one.

24 Because this is a Lanham Act case, retrospective relief (damages due to past sales of
25 infringing products) and prospective relief (agreement to stop selling in the future) are two sides
26 of the same coin. Either way, the theory of liability and damage is the same: the sale of fake

1 Kona coffee products depresses the market price of legitimate Kona coffee products. As an
 2 economic matter, whether that price impact occurred in the past or will occur in the future is
 3 immaterial: the farmer loses money both times in the same way and for the same reason.⁷ In
 4 other words, the past misconduct (remediated) and future misconduct (prevented) cause or would
 5 cause the *same injury* to Plaintiffs and the class. *See* Dkt. 879-3 (Schreck Decl.) ¶ 10 (explaining
 6 that the damages due to past infringement are the best tool to use to calculate the value of future
 7 non-infringement). This Court has previously accepted Dr. Schreck’s methodology for valuing
 8 injunctive relief with respect to prior settlements and found that the relief was quantifiable. *See*
 9 Dkt. 477 ¶ 2.

10 Plaintiffs have previously presented expert declarations concerning the economic value of
 11 the prospective relief that they negotiated in prior settlements. In the first of these declarations,
 12 Dr. Michael Schreck calculated the total market price damages attributable to counterfeit Kona
 13 coffee from 2015 to 2019, and forecast the economic benefit of the removal of mislabeled coffee
 14 from the market. *See* Dkt. 419 ¶¶ 27-34. In connection with the preliminarily approved
 15 settlement with MNS, Dr. Schreck updated those calculations, using the average annual damages
 16 amount that he calculated in his merits expert report (Dkt. 720-2), to again calculate the
 17 economic benefit, in 2023 dollars, that Kona farmers will experience as prices react to the
 18 injunctive relief mandated by these settlements. He calculated that the injunctions achieved in
 19 these settlements (including this settlement with Mulvadi) provide \$81.2 million in value to the
 20 class. *See* Dkt. 879-3 (Schreck Decl.) ¶ 7.

21 This approach is analytically sound and sufficiently rigorous to “accurately ascertain[]”
 22 the value of the injunctive relief. *Staton*, 327 F.3d at 974. It is the same one Plaintiffs used to

23
 24 ⁷ That distinguishes this case from other class settlements where the damages and injunctive relief are fundamentally
 25 distinct. For example, it is common in class settlements for the defendant to pay damages for past harm, and to
 26 institute practice changes to reduce the *risk* of future harm—better warnings, more training of personnel, etc. In
 those situations, courts are understandably reluctant to assign an economic value to the injunctive relief, as doing so
 can be inherently speculative. *See, e.g., Roes*, 944 F.3d at 1041 (in employee misclassification case, relief included
 unpaid minimum wages and an “injunction ... under which any dancer interested in working at the clubs would be
 given the ‘option’ of working as an employee or independent contractor”).

1 value their case for settlement. It is, in broad strokes, the same one Dr. Schreck presented as
 2 Plaintiffs' damages expert at class certification and as a proposed testifying expert and which
 3 was subject to vigorous cross-examination from MNS's counsel. It is thus highly appropriate for
 4 the court to use this measure to value the relief in this case. *See id.*; *see also, e.g., In re: Samsung*
 5 *Top-Load Washing Machine Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litig.*, 997 F.3d
 6 1077, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 2021) (crediting the value of injunctive relief when considering
 7 compensation to class counsel).⁸

8 Taking the already substantial cash component of the settlements and adding the future
 9 economic value, Class Counsel's requested fee amounts to 14.46 percent of the total economic
 10 value of the settlements, a request that falls squarely within those that have been approved by
 11 this Court and other courts in this Circuit.

12 **2. The Complexity and Risk Associated With This Litigation Supports**
the Requested Fees.

13
 14 The degree of complexity and risk present at all stages of this case weighs heavily in
 15 favor of the requested fee. *See, e.g., In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 942 (noting complexity and
 16 novelty of issues as among factors justifying departure from benchmark percentage). This was
 17 far from a cookie-cutter case, and Class Counsel have had to anticipate and respond to arguments

18 ⁸ Indeed, courts have accounted for the value of prospective relief in cases where that value was less ascertainable
 19 and certain than the logical and straightforward economic calculation here. *See Bennett*, 2015 WL 12932332, at *6
 20 (acknowledging it was "difficult to determinate the monetary value of ... prospective relief" in the form of "future
 21 payment of prevailing wages," but given the "substantial and immediate benefit to the class," employing a
 22 "conservative assumption" of future value, resulting in a fee equal to 38.8% of the cash component); *Corzine v.*
 23 *Whirlpool Corp.*, No. 15-5764, 2019 WL 7372275, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2019) (on cross-check, crediting
 24 expert valuation of an extended warranty); *Chieftain Royalty Co. v. XTO Ener. Inc.*, No. 11-29, 2018 WL 2296588,
 25 at *4 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 27, 2018) (policy change with respect to calculating and paying royalties, fee equal to 40% of
 26 the cash component); *Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co.*, No. 11-8405, 2015 WL 10847814, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
 9, 2015) (change in insurance policies permitting rate changes and challenges to validity and enforceability under
 certain circumstances); *In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig.*, No. 09-2036, 2013 WL 11319243, at *13-14 (S.D.
 Fla. Aug. 2, 2013) (changes to how transactions are posted for purposes of assessing overdraft fees, fee equal to 38%
 of cash component); *Browning v. Yahoo! Inc.*, No. 04-1463, 2007 WL 4105971, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007)
 (retail cost of free credit scores); *Lucken Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Ultra Resources, Inc.*, 2010 WL 5387559, at
 *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2010) (basing fee award on percentage of common fund including future economic benefit of
 settlement). *See also Wilson v. Playtika, Ltd.*, 18-cv-5277, 2021 WL 512230, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 2021)
 (Lasnik, J.) (considering "whether counsel's performance generated benefits beyond the cash settlement fund" in
 assessing reasonableness of fee request).

1 that do not tend to emerge in most class actions to continue to drive the case towards trial. “The
2 risk that further litigation might result in Plaintiffs not recovering at all, particularly a case
3 involving complicated legal issues, is a significant factor in the award of fees.” *Omnivision*, 559
4 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-47. Courts “have recognized the risk of litigation to be perhaps the foremost
5 factor to be considered in determining the award of appropriate attorneys’ fees [in part because]
6 despite the most vigorous and competent of efforts, success is never guaranteed.” *Tiro v. Public*
7 *House Invs., LLC*, 2013 WL 4830949, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 2013) (citations and quotations
8 omitted).

9 This case presented risks at every stage. To start, Defendants advanced a legal theory that
10 the Lanham Act does not authorize the core claim in this case—false designation of geographic
11 origin. *See* Dkt. 107, at 6. Although the Court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss on that
12 basis, the issue would remain alive in the case through appeal.

13 Defendants had factual defenses that (1) consumers were not confused by false
14 designations of Kona geographic origin and that (2) Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by laches.
15 Although Plaintiffs believed these defenses to be meritless, they posed an ongoing risk. In
16 particular, whether consumers were confused or were likely to be confused by Defendants’
17 product labels would have come down to a “battle of the experts” at trial (indeed, there was
18 extensive expert discovery here), the result of which is always uncertain.

19 This case was also risky because it was a class action. The only previous attempt to bring
20 a class action on behalf of Kona farmers ended in a denial of class certification more than twenty
21 years before Plaintiffs brought this case. *See Sugai Prods., Inc. v. Kona Kai Farms, Inc.*, No. 97-
22 cv-00043, 1997 WL 824022 (D. Haw. Nov. 19, 1997). Although many elements of a Lanham
23 Act claim map well onto the Rule 23 class certification requirements, successful Lanham Act
24 cases are rare. The typical Lanham Act plaintiff is an individual or corporation holding rights to
25 a trademark. A class case was possible here only because the geographic designation at issue is
26 legitimately used by a relatively small and identifiable group of people.

1 Class certification here posed particular risks because of the need to prove that damages
2 could be measured on a class-wide basis. This required assessing the market for coffee in
3 general, specialty coffees more specifically, and Kona coffee more precisely than that, and then
4 creating a “but-for” world where there was no counterfeiting of coffee. Doing so required
5 accounting for variations in how coffee is sold (green, cherry, or roasted). MNS attacked that
6 analysis at both *Daubert* and summary judgment, and marshaled its own experts to testify that
7 market price damages are not measurable on a classwide basis or, in the alternative, that damages
8 were small. If Plaintiffs could not put forward a reliable, admissible, and ultimately persuasive
9 damages model, then no class could be certified. Plaintiffs anticipated and overcame these
10 hurdles, successfully certifying the class and positioning the class for a successful trial, but as the
11 attached records show, it has been expensive to develop a robust damages methodology.

12 Other forms of damages carried real risks too. When this case was filed, the law of the
13 Ninth Circuit, since reversed by the Supreme Court, *see Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.*,
14 140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020), was that a finding of willfulness was a prerequisite to an award of
15 profits. Plaintiffs also sought to recover funds for corrective advertising, and undoubtedly, MNS
16 had developed competing expert testimony challenging the existence and amount of any
17 corrective advertising damages

18 Finally, this case was inherently risky because it involved more 22 defendants. Any task,
19 any work, any expense could potentially be multiplied by 22. Although the case did produce
20 some economies of scale, this risk materialized in very real form in conducting discovery against
21 so many defendants simultaneously. The global pandemic compounded those risks, particularly
22 as to certain defendants who were acutely affected by Hawaii’s closure to tourism beginning in
23 2020. This introduced the possibility of no recovery from defendants who were at the risk of or
24 did declare bankruptcy, including Mulvadi.

25 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took on this case on a contingent basis. It is an
26 established practice to reward attorneys who assume representation on a contingent basis to

1 compensate them for the risk that they might be paid nothing at all. *See In re Wash. Pub. Power*
2 *Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.*, 19 F.3d 1291, 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). Such a practice encourages the legal
3 profession to assume such a risk and promotes competent representation for plaintiffs who could
4 not otherwise hire an attorney. *Id.* That Class Counsel have foregone other work to litigate the
5 case on a contingent basis also favors the request. *See In re Infospace, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 330 F.
6 Supp. 2d 1203, 1212 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting that “preclusion of other employment by the
7 attorney due to acceptance of the case” is a factor to consider when determining an appropriate
8 fee award).

9 Moreover, the quality of the opposition they faced should also be considered. *See*
10 *DeStefano v. Zynga, Inc.*, 2016 WL 537946, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016) (“The quality of
11 opposing counsel is also relevant to the quality and skill that class counsel provided.”). Class
12 Counsel faced well-resourced and experienced counsel throughout this case. This factor also
13 weighs in favor of the requested fee.

14 **3. The Requested Fees Are Below That Awarded in Other Common**
15 **Fund Cases Involving Valuable Injunctive Relief.**

16 A review of fee awards in other common fund cases underscores the reasonableness of
17 the fee requested here. Class Counsel here request a fee totaling 14.46 percent of the total
18 economic value of the settlements to date, which is substantially lower than the benchmark
19 percentage in this district. As set out above, it is appropriate for the Court to include the value of
20 the settlements’ injunctive relief “as part of the value of a common fund for purposes of applying
21 the percentage method of determining fees.” *Staton*, 327 F.3d at 974; § III(A)(1), *supra*. Class
22 Counsel’s request is in line with fees approved in other settlements involving both a common
23 fund and quantifiable injunctive relief.

24 If the common fund in this case includes the total economic value of the settlement, Class
25 Counsel’s requested fee, of approximately 14.46 percent, is less than that frequently awarded in
26 class actions. *See, e.g. Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (“[I]n most common fund cases, the

1 award exceeds that [25%] benchmark.”); *In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 213 F.3d 454, 463
 2 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (June 19, 2000) (affirming fee award of one third of common fund);
 3 *Lusby v. GameStop Inc.*, No. 12-3783, 2015 WL 1501095, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015)
 4 (awarding fee of one-third of common fund); *de Mira v. Heartland Emp’t Serv., LLC*, No. 12 -
 5 4092, 2014 WL 1026282, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014) (awarding fee of 28% of common
 6 fund); *Knight v. Red Door Salons, Inc.*, 08-cv-1520, 2009 WL 248367, at *7-*8 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
 7 2, 2009)(awarding 30% of common fund); *Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*, No. 96-3008, 1997
 8 WL 450064, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1997) (granting fee award of one-third common fund
 9 where settlement provided additional non-monetary relief).⁹

10 **4. A Lodestar Cross-Check, If Conducted, Confirms the Reasonableness**
 11 **of the Requested Award.**

12 Courts evaluating the reasonableness of fee requests have the discretion to perform a
 13 lodestar cross-check, “which measures the lawyers’ investment of time in the litigation.”
 14 *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1050. The Ninth Circuit has held that district courts need not perform a
 15 such a check in assessing fee applications. *See Wilson*, 2021 WL 512230, at *2 (citing *Farrell v.*
 16 *Bank of Am. Corp., N.A.*, 827 F. Appx. 628, 630 (9th Cir. 2020)); *see also Craft v. Cty. of San*
 17 *Bernardino*, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“A lodestar cross-check is not
 18 required in this circuit, and in some cases is not a useful reference point.”); *Benson*, 2023 WL
 19 3761929, at *12 (declining to conduct lodestar cross-check). Nevertheless, courts sometimes
 20 employ a “streamlined” lodestar analysis to “cross-check” the reasonableness of a requested
 21 award. *See, e.g., Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1050 (“[W]hile the primary basis of the fee award remains

22 _____
 23 ⁹ Even if the Court treated the immediate monetary benefits and the injunctive components of the settlements
 24 separately, Class Counsel’s request is still consistent with awards in cases in which the Court took note of benefits
 25 beyond a cash settlement. *See Bennett*, 2015 WL 12932332, at *6 (taking into account future value, awarding fee
 26 equal to 38.8% of the cash component); *Anderson v. Merit Energy Co.*, 07-916, 2009 WL 3378526, at *1 (D. Colo.
 Oct. 20, 2009) (awarding 26 percent of common fund including future economic benefit, or 45 percent of immediate
 cash component); *Chieftain Royalty*, 2018 WL 2296588, at *4 (awarding fee equal to 40% of the cash component in
 settlement also prospective changes to royalty calculation)); *In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig.*, 2013 WL
 11319243, at *13-14 (awarding fee equal to 38% of cash component in settlement also mandating changes to how
 transactions are posted for purposes of assessing overdraft fees).

1 the percentage method, the lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the reasonableness of a
 2 given percentage award.”). As explained in prior fee applications and as the Court acknowledged
 3 in the most recent order concerning fees (Dkt. 843 ¶ 9), Class Counsel have not, as of the date of
 4 this filing, recovered their lodestar. If conducted, a lodestar cross-check including this requested
 5 fee would reveal that Class Counsel fees are a barely positive multiplier of 1.2, and well below
 6 what numerous courts have approved in common fund cases. *See* Lichtman Decl. ¶¶ 9-14
 7 (providing lodestar and rate information for LCHB); Paine Decl. ¶¶ 9-14 (same for KTC).¹⁰ *See*,
 8 *e.g.*, *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 n.6 (compiling fee awards and finding that 83 percent fell
 9 between 1.0 and 4.0); *Martin*, 2022 WL 17038908, at *14 (approving 6.33 multiplier); *Johnson*
 10 *v. Fujitsu Tech. & Bus. of Am., Inc.*, No. 16-cv-03698-NC, 2018 WL 2183253, at *7, (N.D. Cal.
 11 May 11, 2018) (approving 4.37 multiplier); *In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.*,
 12 2017 WL 6040065, at *9, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017) (finding 3.66 multiplier to be “well within the
 13 range of awards in other cases.”); *In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig.*, 2016 WL 2731524
 14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016) (approving 6.0 multiplier); *In re Payment Card Antitrust Litig.*, 991 F.
 15 Supp. 2d 437, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (approving 3.4 multiplier); *In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 586
 16 F. Supp. 2d 732, 741 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (approving 5.2 multiplier). Of course, Class Counsel’s
 17 lodestar will increase as Class Counsel will spend substantial amounts of time ensuring that the
 18 claims process goes smoothly and that the settlement is implemented effectively, just as they
 19 have done and continue to do with prior settlements.

20 **B. Class Counsel’s Expenses Are Reasonable.**

21 “The Ninth Circuit allows recovery of pre-settlement litigation costs in the context of
 22 class action settlement.” *Arthur v. Sallie Mae Inc.*, 10-cv-198, 2012 WL 4076119, at *2 (W.D.
 23 Wash. Sept. 17, 2012) (citing *Staton*, 327 F.3d at 974); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). This

24
 25 ¹⁰ The declarations of counsel calculate lodestar to date using current rates. It is a “well established” common
 26 practice for “attorneys in common fund cases” to adjust their billing to their current levels to account for “any delay
 in payment.” *Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, No. 16-CV-05479-JST, 2018 WL 6619983, at *14 n.17 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
 18, 2018) (quoting *Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S.*, 307 F.3d 997, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002)).

1 includes expenses that are reasonable, necessary, directly related to the litigation, and normally
 2 charged to a fee-paying client. *See, e.g., Willner v. Manpower Inc.*, No. 11-cv-02846-JST, 2015
 3 WL 3863625, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015).

4 Here, Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of \$170,000. Class Counsel have expended
 5 \$3,392,005.99 in out-of-pocket expenses to date; \$108,145.99 is unreimbursed. *See* Lichtman
 6 Decl. ¶¶ 15-16; Paine Decl. ¶ 15-17.¹¹ In addition, Class Counsel will continue to incur expenses
 7 in connection with the claims administration process and in closing out this litigation. *See*
 8 Lichtman Decl. ¶ 17. Because this is the final settlement to be presented to this Court, Plaintiffs
 9 seek approval of those anticipated amounts, which will be returned to the class if they are higher
 10 than what is actually incurred.

11 Litigating a case of this size and complexity inevitably costs money, and these expenses –
 12 attributable largely to, among other items set out in the accompanying declarations of counsel,
 13 experts, travel, document hosting, and multiple mediation days – are commensurate with the
 14 stakes, complexity, intensity, and technical nature of the litigation. They also demonstrate Class
 15 Counsel’s commitment to the litigation, even as Class Counsel have made every effort to litigate
 16 efficiently. *See Beesley v. Int’l Paper Co.*, No. 3:06-CV-703-DRH-CJP, 2014 WL 375432, at *3
 17 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2014) (“Class Counsel had a strong incentive to keep expenses at a reasonable
 18 level due to the high risk of no recovery when the fee is contingent.”).

19 **C. Service Awards for the Class Representatives Are Appropriate.**

20 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “named plaintiffs, as opposed to designated class
 21 members who are not named plaintiffs, are eligible for reasonable [service awards].” *Staton*, 327
 22 F.3d at 977; *Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) (service awards
 23 “are fairly typical in class action cases”). Such awards are “intended to compensate class
 24 representatives for work done on behalf of the class [and] make up for financial or reputational
 25 risk undertaken in bringing the action.” *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 958. Service awards are

26 ¹¹ This number assumes that the Court grants the pending request for reimbursement from the MNS settlement.

1 appropriate in this case, in which the class representatives have invested enormous amounts of
2 time into the prosecution of this action, even as they continue to run their small coffee farms.

3 Declarations submitted by each of the class representatives set out their unflagging
4 commitment to this case and to delivering positive results to their community through this case.
5 *See* Dkt. 421-25, Dkt. 569-73. As those declarations explained, even while they ran their small
6 coffee farms, they have devoted countless hours to this case, meeting regularly with Class
7 Counsel, responding to voluminous discovery requests, and then actively participating in
8 settlement efforts, including every mediation to date. They have made themselves visible in their
9 community through their participation in this lawsuit, and have spent additional countless hours
10 answering questions from other class members about the case. *Id.* These efforts have continued
11 through the implementation of the prior settlements, through the negotiation of this settlement
12 with MNS, and will continue as the case continues. The class representatives continue to carry
13 out their duties diligently, energetically, and effectively, up to and through the recent litigated
14 class certification motion. *See* Dkt. 569-73.

15 Under these circumstances, the requested service awards (\$2,500 per farm) are well
16 within the range regularly awarded by Ninth Circuit courts, or if anything, less than typically
17 awarded. *See, e.g., In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.*, 11-cv-2509, 2015 WL 5158730, at
18 *17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) (awarding service awards of \$120,000 and \$80,000); *Beck, et al. v.*
19 *Boeing Co.*, Case No. 00-CV-0301-MJP, Dkt. 1067 at 4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2004) (awarding
20 \$100,000 service payments to each named plaintiff); *Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*,
21 No. CV 08 1365 CW EMC, 2010 WL 1687832, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (granting
22 \$20,000 service award where plaintiff “was subjected to questioning regarding her personal
23 financial affairs and other sensitive subjects”). Courts elsewhere have awarded amounts far
24 exceeding those sought here. *See, e.g., In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig.*, No. 10-318, 2013
25 WL 6577029, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2013) (approving \$125,000 service award); *Ingram v. The*
26 *Coca-Cola Co.*, 200 F.R.D. 685, 694 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (awarding \$300,000 service payments to

1 each of four representative plaintiffs); *Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc.*, No. CIV-02-285-RAW, 2011
2 WL 4478766, at *12–13 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2011) (awarding \$100,000 service awards); *Velez*
3 *v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.*, No. 04 Civ. 09194 (CM), 2010 WL 4877852, at *8, *26 (S.D.N.Y.
4 Nov. 30, 2010) (granting service awards of \$175,000 and higher); *Seaman v. Duke Univ.*, No.
5 1:15-CV-462, 2019 WL 4674758, at *7-8 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2019) (approving service award
6 of \$125,000).

7 **IV. Conclusion**

8 Class Counsel respectfully request that the Court approve attorneys’ fees, reimbursement
9 of expenses, and service awards to the named plaintiffs.

10 Dated: September 18, 2023

11 KARR TUTTLE CAMPBELL

12 /s/ Nathan T. Paine

13 Nathan T. Paine, WSBA #34487
14 Daniel T. Hagen, WSBA #54015
15 Joshua M. Howard, WSBA #52189
16 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300
17 Seattle, Washington 98104
18 206.223.1313

LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN &
BERNSTEIN, LLP

/s/ Jason L. Lichtman

19 Jason L. Lichtman (*pro hac vice*)
20 Daniel E. Seltz (*pro hac vice*)
21 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
22 New York, NY 10013-1413
23 212-355-9500

24 Andrew Kaufman (*pro hac vice*)
25 222 2nd Avenue South, Suite 1640
26 Nashville, TN 37201
615.313.9000

*Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
and the Proposed Settlement Class*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Daniel E. Seltz, certify that on September 18, 2023, caused the foregoing to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to those attorneys of record registered on the CM/ECF system.

/s Daniel E. Seltz
Daniel E. Seltz

2847664.2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26